The discrimination claim, it held, should have been (but was not) brought within ninety days of the plaintiff's receipt of the first right-to-sue letter. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that both of the plaintiff's ADA claims flouted separate statutory time limits. §§ 12112(a), 12203(a), and supplemental claims under Puerto Rico law. He sued Humana, Cardona, and CTS, asserting claims of discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990(ADA), see 42 U.S.C. Less than a month after the transmittal of the second right-to-sue letter-but over four months after the transmittal of the first right-to-sue letter-the plaintiff repaired to the federal district court. The EEOC obliged, transmitting such a notice (the second right-to-sue letter) within two months of the filing of the second charge. The second charge requested the prompt issuance of a right-to-sue letter without further investigation. Withal, it added a new twist: the second charge limned a claim for retaliation (a subject not mentioned in the first charge). The second charge covered the same time frame as the first charge and reiterated the original claim of disability discrimination. Consequently, the ninety-day period lapsed. Although the plaintiff filed a new administrative charge (the second charge) against Humana some two months after the first right-to-sue letter issued, he did not sue. It explicitly warned that a failure to file suit within ninety days would result in the loss of any right to bring a suit based on the first charge. A copy of this letter (the first right-to-sue letter) was simultaneously sent to the plaintiff's attorney. After six and one-half months, the EEOC notified the plaintiff that it was terminating its processing of his charge and that he had the right, during the next ninety days, to initiate a civil action based on the first charge. There, less than two weeks after his firing, the plaintiff charged Humana with discriminating against him on account of his disability (the first charge). The next stop for the plaintiff was the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The denouement occurred on Septem(the day after the examination): the plaintiff was given his walking papers. When the test results predictably conformed to this devious design, Humana cashiered the plaintiff. This artifice ensured that the plaintiff would post a comparatively low score. The plaintiff says that his non-disabled colleagues were given the answers to the test in advance, but he was not. The plaintiff attributes this adverse employment action to disability discrimination and retaliation, alleging that Cardona repeatedly mocked his diabetes and mental conditions.Īccording to the complaint, the means to Cardona's end was a rigged test. The plaintiff's odyssey at Humana would prove to be short-lived: his supervisor, defendant-appellee Solciré Cardona, orchestrated his ouster roughly six weeks later.
In August of 2011, plaintiff-appellant Giovanni Rivera–Díaz, who had been recruited by defendant-appellee Caribbean Temporary Services (CTS), embarked on new employment with defendant-appellee Humana Health Plans of Puerto Rico, Inc. We draw additional facts from documentation incorporated by reference in the complaint. Although none of these facts has been tested in the crucible of trial, we assume their accuracy. Inasmuch as this appeal follows the granting of a motion to dismiss, we draw the relevant facts from the plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly, the district court dismissed his complaint. In this case, the plaintiff managed to trip over not one, but two, of these temporal benchmarks. When federal rights-creating statutes are conditioned upon the prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, time limits are often an essential part of the regulatory scheme. Elizabeth Pérez–Lleras, with whom Carl Schuster and Schuster Aguiló LLP were on brief, for remaining appellees. Carlos Concepción–Castro for appellee Caribbean Temporary Services. Ballesté–Frank and Valenzuela–Alvarado, LLC were on brief, for appellants. José Enrico Valenzuela–Alvarado, with whom Carmen I. Decided: April 11, 2014īefore LYNCH, Chief Judge, SELYA and HOWARD, Circuit Judges. HUMANA INSURANCE OF PUERTO RICO, INC., et al., Defendants, Appellees. Giovanni RIVERA–DÍAZ, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v.
United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.
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